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Gender, Intersectionality and Religious Manifestation 
Before the European Court of Human Rights 
 
I. Introduction 
The gendered dimension of religious manifestation has been brought to the forefront of 
the European public debate after episodes such as the so-called ‘Burkini ban’ in France 
(Zempi, 2016). The controversy showed how women’s clothing often become the site of 
political battles about gender, religion and identity. However, female Muslim clothing 
is not the only gendered expression of religious manifestation. Veiling practices and 
gendered dress codes in other religions are equally significant when understanding how 
religion and gender frequently intersect, as they provide for examples of religious 
manifestations with clear gender implications. This paper will demonstrate how 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) can be successfully applied to expose the 
shortcomings of a unidimensional approach to judicial interpretation in these cases and 
thus serves as a basis for further research along these lines.  
The topic of religious manifestation has been for a long time codified in international 
instruments of human rights protection. In Europe, it is protected by Art.9(2) of the 
European Convention of Human Rights (hereinafter ECHR), which states that: “Freedom 
to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by 
law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection 
of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. The 
protection of religious manifestation provided by the European Court of Human Rights 
(hereinafter ECtHR) in its interpretation of this provision is particularly important for a 
number of reasons. First, because these decisions are in principle binding upon State 
parties. Second, because the case law of the Strasbourg court is, given its reputation, a 
source of jurisprudential inspiration for courts in Europe and beyond. And third, 
because given the national and religious diversity in the European continent, cases on 
religious manifestation before the ECtHR often express complex and varied 
intersectional situations with important political consequences. In this regard, 
intersectionality highlights the interaction of multiple identities and experiences and 
subordination of women. Crucially, intersectionality, when focusing on the nodes of 
gender and religion, recognizes that anti-racism often fails to interrogate patriarchy and 
that feminism can reproduce racist practices (Crenshaw, 1989). As we will show in this 
article, the case law of the ECtHR on religious manifestation can hardly be understood 
in the absence of an intersectional approach, as such approach reveals important patters 
underlying to court decision-making.  
In recent years, the social and academic salience of intersectionality has been paralleled 
by an increasing body of literature analyzing the decisions of the Strasbourg Court from 
an intersectional perspective. Examining the case of B.S. v Spain, Yoshida (2013) has 
recently argued that the ECtHR might be timidly opening to intersectional 
considerations. However, somewhat contrarily, Rubio-Marin and Moeschel (2015) have 
underlined the need for the ECtHR to give further recognition to intersectional 
discrimination in their analysis of case law on forced sterilization of Roma women.   And 
with regards to the approach of the ECtHR to Islamic headscarf cases, Radacic (2008) has 
accused the court of being insufficiently sensitive to intersectionality of discrimination. 
While academic works on this topic vary in the assessments they make of the Courts’ 
case law and in the type of cases they cover, these pieces often have in common the focus 
only in one or a few cases of the Strasbourg Court, as well as the doctrinal, normative 
and/or qualitative approach. Although there are instances of works engaging in 
statistical description of the cases (see Ferrari, 2012), systematic empirical reviews of 
intersectionality before the ECtHR, especially with regards to religious manifestation, 
are to the best of our knowledge largely missing. 
This article aims at filling this gap. Using a configurational empirical approach and an 
original database, we exhaustively analyse the case law of the ECtHR on Art.9(2) ECHR. 
Our aim is to systematically review the treatment of the ECtHR to intersectional 
categories defined by their gender, religion and nationality, and in particular to find 
patterns of litigation success or defeat of these groups. Such a systematic review is 
important because it will help to expand the focus beyond the most frequently analysed 
intersectional categories -typically, Muslim women-, and to include also other 
intersectional groups whose patterns of litigation success or defeat are less known. 
Additionally, the analysis will provide an input of evidence-based systematic 
knowledge to academic and social debates on gender and religious manifestation, 
improving the quality of public deliberation about the topic. Indeed, the article provides 
for some interesting findings which can help fine-tune some of the existing literature in 
the field. As expected, Muslim women, which were always nationals of the State 
addressed by the complaint, had a clear pattern of litigation defeat, and always lost cases 
about their right to religious manifestation before the ECtHR. But this contrasted with 
the treatment of Muslim men, that were a very successful category of applicants. These 
findings underlined both the important of intersectionalizing the analysis and, at the 
same time, the strong role that the gender dimension plays in cases on religious 
manifestation. 
The remainder of this article is as follows. After this introduction, we will provide some 
basic explanations about the right to religious freedom in the legal regime of the 
European Convention of Human Rights. Subsequently, we will present our theoretical 
framework, focusing on the importance of intersectionality for the analysis of 
phenomena in the judicial arena and, more concretely, in human rights cases on religious 
manifestation. Next, we explain the methodology of this research, multi value QCA, 
arguing that it is particularly well-suited to explore intersectional groups and to test 
intersectional hypotheses. In the following section we present our empirical analysis, 
explaining patterns of litigation success and defeat of intersectional groups. The last 
section discusses the findings and concludes. 
 
II. The ECHR and the right to religious manifestation  
The European Court of Human Rights is the judicial organ of the Council of Europe, 
which is a supervisory regional human rights body, tasked with protecting the rights 
enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights. The importance of freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion has been stressed on several occasions by the ECtHR. 
Generally speaking, the freedom of thought, conscience and religion is regarded as one 
of the foundations of democratic society and has been described as a “precious asset” by 
the Court (Letsas, 2006).  
Whilst Article 9 of the Convention concerns freedom of religion in particular it extends 
to ideas, philosophical convictions of all kinds provided that they have attained a certain 
level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance.1  Once the Court has established 
that a religious belief meets this test, it falls under the protection of Article 9. Article 9(1) 
ECHR guarantees freedom of thought, conscience and religion, which includes the 
freedom to change one’s religion or belief and the freedom to worship either alone or in 
community with others. This freedom of religion is absolute, in the sense that it cannot 
be limited by the State parties.  
Freedom to manifest a religion or belief, however, can be legitimately limited under 
Article 9(2) of the ECHR. The Court has held that a State cannot assess the legitimacy of 
the manifestation of the religious belief as this would be a breach of the Contracting 
Party State’s neutrality. Instead the Strasbourg Court clarified that an act motivated by 
a religion or belief is considered a “manifestation” if it is “intimately linked to the 
religion or belief” in the sense that there is a “sufficiently close and direct nexus between 
the act and the underlying belief”.2  The ECtHR highlighted that the religious act should 
not be “remotely connected to a precept of faith” but it is immaterial whether the 
manifestation is mandatory or not by a religion or belief which falls under the protection 
of Article 9.3  Accordingly, state interference of the manifestation of religion can only be 
limited if it is prescribed by law, pursues a legitimate aim and is necessary in a 
democratic society.  This means that there has to be a legal basis for the restriction, and 
that the limitation must be proportionate to its aims. Furthermore, the ECtHR have 
allowed for a wide margin of appreciation in freedom of religion cases. The “margin of 
appreciation” refers to the space for manoeuvre that the Strasbourg organs are willing 
to grant national authorities, in fulfilling their obligations under the European 
Convention on Human Rights (the Convention) (Letsas, 2005). 
This article focuses on this second aspect of the right to religious freedom: its facet of 
religious manifestation. The reason is the political salience of this right as a preferential 
site of gendered religious manifestations. As it will be argued in the next section, it is for 
that reason that an approach based on intersectionality is the most adequate to carry out 
the analysis. 
 
III. Theory and configurational hypotheses  
a. Intersectionality in the courtroom 
In this subsection we aim at providing a brief presentation of the idea of intersectionality, 
as it will be central to the rest of this article, and we will explain how intersectionality 
can be useful for research on courts. Intersectionality can be considered both as a 
normative and as an analytical approach. Insofar as we pursue an empirical endeavor, 
our use of intersectionality in this research is purely analytical and methodological. In 
the development of intersectionality in the social sciences, however, normative, 
analytical and methodological considerations have been strongly intertwined.  
The emergence of intersectionality as a central concept for the social sciences started 
approximately three decades ago, when authors such as Kimberle Crenshaw (Crenshaw, 
1989) and Audre Lorde (Lorde, 1984) argued about the need to take into account the 
intersection between the multiples identities of individuals in order to understand social 
dynamics of exclusion and subordination. These approaches pushed the visibilization of 
issues of intersectionality, and had an impact on empirical research, which increasingly 
introduced intersectional categories into its analyses. Over the years, academics have 
tackled the issue of intersectionality globally over a variety of different issues, including 
domestic violence, immigration law and policies, family life, the welfare system and 
institutional racism, sexism, homophobia, ageism, religious discrimination, transgender 
discrimination and disability discrimination.  Feminist theory developed a concept of 
intersectionality that posed that subjectivity is constituted by mutually reinforcing 
vectors of race, gender, class and sexuality (Nash, 2008). This signaled a move away from 
what is described as an additive model of analysis where identity is seen as independent 
strands of inequality and, rather: “views these vectors of inequality as overlapping and 
interacting to form complex configurations of subjectivity” (Choo and Ferree, 2010: 131).  
Intersectional theory has become an increasingly popular theoretical approach within 
social research and is considered the key analytical tool in tackling disadvantage. 
Interestingly, the main question within intersectionality theory is that of who embodies 
an intersecting subject position within identity politics (Nash, 2008). In her analysis of 
intersectional theory Nash argues that, “this unresolved theoretical dispute makes it 
unclear whether intersectionality is a theory of marginalized subjectivity or a 
generalized theory of identity” (Nash, 2008: 10).  
Beyond its obvious normative implications, intersectionality is also a very important tool 
for empirically-oriented social scientists.  One traditional limitation, however, has been 
the absence of a clear methodology for intersectional research and the lack of a 
developed research design and methods that could be used universally to apply 
intersectional theory to research projects (Shields, 2008). One justification for this was 
attributed in part, to how difficult it is to construct a research paradigm which is 
attentive to “the complexity that arises when the subject of analysis expands to include 
multiple dimensions of social life and categories of analysis” (McCall, 2005: 1773).  
However, as we argue in the methods section, we believe that the emergence of 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis, which we use in this article, might represent an 
important improvement in this regard (see also Ragin and Fiss, 2016). 
Intersectionality also plays a central role in empirical research in law and courts. In this 
field, there is a well-stablished tradition of analysis of certain socio-demographic aspects 
of individuals in the courtroom, such as race (Lizzote, 1978), gender (Daly and Bordt, 
1995) or social class (Dalessio and Stolzenberg, 1993). In line with intersectional 
approaches, these aspects of individuals, however, do not run in parallel to each other, 
but instead they interact, forming specific intersectional categories of litigants which 
literature has increasingly investigated, particularly with regards to their impact on 
judicial decision-making (Collin and Moyer, 2008). In their recent work, Kahn Best et al. 
(2011) identified two dimensions of intersectionality that are relevant to empirical 
judicial studies: demographic intersectionality and claim intersectionality. Demographic 
intersectionality refers to the intersectional socio-demographic categories to which an 
individual belongs, even if the object of litigation is unrelated to such categories. Claim 
intersectionality occurs when the very object of litigation is an expression of an 
intersectional group to which the individual belongs (see Kahn Best et al, 2011: 994). The 
authors theorize that both aspects of intersectionality can drive to different -often less 
favorable- treatment in the courtroom for certain intersectional categories as a result of 
mechanisms such as stereotyping or deficient legal regulation of intersectional 
situations. 
 
b. Art.9(2) and three dimensions of identity 
Intersectional considerations play also a role with regards to the right to religious 
manifestation in cases before the ECtHR. From the perspective of Art.9(2) of the 
Convention, there are three main dimensions of individuals whose intersections are 
relevant to understand the cases: religion, gender and nationality. The ECtHR always 
provides for information about these three dimensions in its rulings, they constitute 
some of the central elements of demographic intersectionality of the claimants, and very 
often they are a source of claim intersectionality.  
Religion is relevant to cases on Art.9(2) for the very obvious reason that this provision is 
designed to protect religious manifestation. Different religions follow different patterns 
of religious manifestation, which might be differently affected by national and 
supranational regulations about the exercise of this right. In this article, we will focus 
specially in the differences in treatment between Christian and Muslim applicants. The 
reason is that Christianity is traditionally the hegemonic religion in most countries 
covered by the Convention, while Islam is a minority religion in Europe4, therefore 
providing an interesting focus of comparison. We expect, in the regard, a more favorable 
treatment of Christian applicants by the Court than of Muslim applicants.   
Gender is important, as religions often have gender-specific forms of expression. Many 
religions require some form of manifestation, which, similarly to the plight of Muslim 
women, also disproportionately affects women. In many cases, women are expected to 
dress in a modest manner and the levels of modesty are similar, depending on the level 
of religiosity of the individual. Orthodox Christian and Jewish texts both state that 
women should cover their hair and dress in loose clothing; similarly Catholic doctrine 
requires that women cover their hair at mass (see Cristofar, 2001: 451). It is important to 
note that dress is at the centre of identity of an individual, and as argued by the ECtHR 
the manifestation of religious belief lies at the centre of religious freedom.5  Even in 
Buddhism and Hinduism there are conceptions of modesty which require women to 
manifest their beliefs in certain kinds of ways. Given the persistent discrimination of 
women in European societies, and the fact that they often present gender-specific forms 
of religious manifestation, we expect their treatment by the ECtHR to be less favorable 
than that afforded to male applicants.  
Finally, nationality is essential to the way in which countries grapple with the right to 
manifest a religious belief. Migrants often bring with them forms of religious 
manifestation that are different from those dominant in their host countries. At the same 
time, the integration of migrants and national minorities has become a focus of political 
debate in many countries, and at the heart of these debates is to what extent liberal 
democracies can enforce integration, and how.  What is considered integration differs in 
each European state depending on the communities’ origin, the existence of a colonial 
history, the existence of national churches, the existence of a state-church relationship, 
commitment to multiculturalism, national policies towards immigration and “the tone 
and language of public discourse.”6 Sometimes, however, integration is identified with 
assimilation. These approaches can give rise to a restrictive regulation of religious 
manifestation, therefore penalizing non-national groups that are expected to assimilate 
in return for being allow to reside in the country. This, however, contrasts with the 
background that drove to the creation of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
which was strongly related to the violation of human rights suffered by minorities and 
non-national groups in Europe. Given this background, we expect the ECtHR to be 
especially considerate with the claims of non-nationals as a result of the recognition of 
their specifically weak situation. 
While each of these three dimensions is individually relevant to analyze cases on 
Art.9(2), in this article we focused on the intersectional categories to which their 
interaction gives raise. The reason is that we had a strong theoretical expectation that 
only through an intersectional approach to the cases we would be able to identify 
patterns of judicial victory or defeat with sufficient precision. As we will show, this 
intuition was confirmed by the analyses. 
 
IV. Data and methods  
This article uses an original database of cases of the European Court of Human Rights 
on Art.9(2) of the Convention, codified by the authors for the purposes of this research. 
The case selection was made using the HUDOC database of the official website of the 
European Court of Human Rights. The first case on Art.9(2) dates back to 1993. The 
search was made for all cases of the Grand Chamber and Chamber, including all rulings 
of the ECtHR on Art.9(2) in the two official languages of the Court: English and French. 
The search engine included some cases which however did not actually deal with 
Art.9(2); such cases were removed7. The final database was composed of 66 cases8. These 
66 cases are not a sample, but the whole population of rulings on Art.9(2) at the time of 
preparation of the manuscript. The cases are listed in Appendix 1, at the end of this 
article. 
To analyse the treatment of intersectional groups by the ECtHR, the article uses 
Qualtitative Comparative Analysis. QCA takes a configurational approach to causation, 
in which the focus is put in the analysis of how different characteristics of the cases 
interact between themselves: in QCA cases are regarded as ‘combinations of properties’ 
(Berg-Scholosser et al, 2009: 6). Unlike statistical techniques, which seek to understand 
the causal impact of a variable independently of the effect of all other explanatory 
variables, QCA focuses on how factors interact between themselves in particular cases. 
This emphasis on interaction and combination of properties makes QCA especially apt 
to analyse intersectional categories, as showed by recent literature in the field (Ragin and 
Fiss, 2016). While QCA allows the identification of relevant configurations and 
interactions of conditions in the production of a result, it also permits identifying factors 
that are individually sufficient to produce it. This is because QCA uses Boolean 
minimization to drop redundant conditions (Rihoux and De Meur, 2009: 35). In 
analysing judicial decisions on Art.9(2), this turned out to be very useful in order to 
assess whether in each case intersectional categories or uni-dimensional ones were more 
relevant, without forcing the data to fit into either of them. 
Multi-value QCA is a modality of qualitative comparative analysis that allows the use 
of conditions with more than two categories, therefore avoiding artificial 
dichotomizations (Cronqvist and Berg-Schlosser, 2009: 70). As the dimensions of the 
applicants whose intersections we analyse in this article are categorical and often 
included more than two possible values, mvQCA was the most adequate technique for 
this research. To carry out the analyses, the software QCAGUI for R was used (Duşa,, 
2007), as it allows the performance of multi value analyses including the use of 
parsimonious solutions and the display of inclusion, PRI and coverage indicators. 
Inclusion  (‘Incl’), similarly to the traditional concept of consistency, indicates the share 
of cases covered by a path that had the outcome of interest; Proportional Reduction in 
Inconsistency (‘PRI’) indicates the extent to which a path is a subset of the outcome rather 
than of the negation of the outcome; raw coverage (‘cov.r’) indicates the share of cases 
with the outcome of interest that are covered by a path, including those that are also 
covered by other paths of the solution; unique coverage (‘cov.u’) of a path indicates the 
share of cases with the outcome of interest that are covered exclusively by that path and 
not by any other path in the solution (see  Rihoux and Ragin, 2009: 182; Schneider and 
Wagemann 2012: 242). While mvQCA has a specific type of notation, for the sake of 
simplicity in this article we will use the tag of each category when displaying the models. 
The data matrix was prepared by the researchers after a qualitative analysis of each of 
the rulings covered. The outcome of the research is the declaration of breach of Art.9(2) 
of the ECtHR. If that provision is declared by the ECtHR to be breached at least in one 
regard for one applicant to a case, the case is coded as {1}. In the contrary case, it is coded 
as {0}. The religion of the applicant was coded into three groups: Christian {1}, Muslim 
{2} and other religion {0}. The gender was coded into male {0}, female {1}, a mix of 
applicants of different categories (including legal persons) {2} and legal persons {3}. The 
nationality category was dichotomous: national of the country addressed by the 
complaint {0} or not {1}. Following the best practices in QCA, the data matrix is provided 
in Appendix 2. 
For Boolean minimization, this article is using intermediate solutions and a consistency 
cut-off of 0.75, therefore allowing the inclusion of some contradictory configurations 
only when they had a high share of positive cases. The impact of this in the results is 
transparently discussed through information about inclusion and coverage indicators, 
and by identifying the cases that are inconsistent within each configuration. The reason 
for this decision is twofold. First, it is related to the general challenge that the analysis of 
judicial decisions pose for QCA: unlike other objects of study in the social sciences, 
judicial behaviour is often the result of case-specific and idiosyncratic factors, in addition 
to cross-case conditions. Think for instance about the specific legal rules (out of the 
thousands of them contained in the legal system) that apply to one case, and only to that 
case and not to the others. Or about the range of facts analysed by the court, which is 
potentially infinite and by definition vary from case to case. Judicial decision-making is 
often the result of cross-case factors but also of case-specific idiosyncratic reasons. For 
this reason, contradiction-free models will often be very difficult to develop (albeit not 
always impossible), unless databases are artificially inflated with the inclusion of 
conditions that refer to case-specific events, to the detriment of the parsimony of the 
models. This points at the need, in configurational research, to develop strategies to deal 
with this peculiar nature of judicial behaviour. A transparent, fully explained use of 
slightly lower consistency cut-offs is in our view the best such strategy in the case of this 
research. 
The use of lower consistency cut-offs has to do also with the specific aims of this article. 
This research does not seek to explain all causal factors that account for judicial decision-
making in cases on Art.9(2), but rather it aims at understanding patterns of litigation 
success or defeat of certain intersectional social categories. While those two enterprises 
clearly overlap, they are slightly different and the theoretical focus of this article is on 
the latter one. For that reason, the analyses did not include all potential conditions 
explaining judicial behaviour. In this article, logical contradictions are the unavoidable 
consequence of the focus on the patterns of success and defeat of certain intersectional 
social groups, rather than on judicial behaviour as such. The inclusion of contradictory 
configurations when they had a high consistency score allowed a better understanding 
of the litigation success and defeat patterns of the relevant intersectional groups, while 
inconsistent cases where transparently indicated and qualitatively discussed.  
 
V. Analyses  
 
a. Winner intersectional categories 
Our first model shows categories which were generally successful litigants. Regarding 
the directional expectations, being not national, male or Christian were expected to 
contribute to the declaration of breach of Art.9(2). 
- TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE- 
The model has a very high inclusion of 0.889, meaning that almost 90 per cent of the 
cases covered by these paths were effectively cases in which a breach of Art.9(2) was 
declared. It also has a high coverage of 0.681, meaning that almost 70 per cent of the cases 
of breach of Art.9(2) were covered by at least one of the paths of the model. Indeed, the 
model shows some interesting findings. 
The most frequent path to the declaration of breach of Art.9(2) is in fact not intersectional, 
while the remaining paths are so. This shows that both intersectional and not 
intersectional categories of applicants might exhibit high rates of litigation success. 
Furthermore, the not intersectional path -displayed the first in the model- refers to 
applications that have applicants which belong to different groups in the “gender” 
condition. This is interesting, because by definition these cases are those in which the 
claim is less likely to have a clearly gendered dimension. Said in other terms: when 
claims on religious manifestation were gender-neutral the outcome of litigation was 
usually a victory. This safe path to the victory of the claimants had an inclusion score of 
0.867. This means that only less than 14 per cent of the cases with mixed gender 
applications ended up in a defeat of the applicants. 
According to the second path, male Muslims were actually one of the most successful 
categories of applicants. Indeed, this is the second most frequent route to litigation 
success (19 per cent of all claimants’ victories), and at the same time an overwhelming 
majority of cases brought by this type of applicants (90 per cent) were successful. This 
finding contrasts with the model for litigation defeat (see below) which shows the 
opposite effect for (national) female Muslims. Furthermore, this points at the scarce 
explanatory capacity of the unidimensional category “Muslim” and at the need to 
intersectionalize the analysis of this religious group by introducing the gender 
dimension in order to find clear patterns. Something similar happens with the third path, 
as it points at being a Christian female as a very safe route to litigation success, again the 
opposite result as for Muslim females.  In the case of Christian women, however, it needs 
to be noted that only one case is covered by this path, so we should be particularly careful 
when extracting conclusions.  
The paths four and five show that legal persons, either Muslim or Christian, are a 
successful type of litigants (although, again, only one instance existed of a case brought 
about by a Muslim legal person). These cases are also less likely to have a clear gendered 
dimension as they are usually brought about by religious denominations themselves. 
Another possible explanation for the high success rates of these types of applicants is 
that, being legal persons, they can mobilize higher litigation resources than most other 
applicants.  
The final path shows that being a male non-national has often been a safe route to 
litigation success. It is interesting to note that this is the only path to victory in which the 
nationality of the applicant seemed to have any relevance, having disappeared in 
Boolean minimization for all other cases. 
 
b. Loser intersectional categories 
The second model analyses the absence of the outcome: declarations by the ECtHR that 
Art.9(2) has not been violated and, therefore, patterns of defeat of the applicant. 
Directional expectations are that being a female, Muslim and national contribute to 
litigation defeat. 
- TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE- 
The path is striking for a number of features. First, the only sure path to defeat is being 
a Muslim woman national of the country addressed by the complaint. Despite the low 
consistency cut-off selected, no other uni-dimensional or intersectional category seems 
to have similarly high rates of litigation defeat as national female Muslims. Second, this 
is indeed a strikingly safe route to defeat: 100 per cent of claimants belonging to this 
intersectional category lost their case. Thirdly, this group of claimants actually make a 
relatively high share of the total cases of litigation defeat: more than 30 per cent. 
A qualitative review of the cases shows that something they generally had in common 
is that these were judicial decisions about situations of ‘claim intersectionality’, usually 
about gendered religious clothing. It wasn’t until 1993 that the first case in relation to 
Article 9(2) was heard by the ECtHR.9  Around the same time in the early 1990s, the act 
of wearing an Islamic headscarf was banned in schools across Turkey. This prohibition 
was followed by a similar ban on ‘conspicuous religious signs’ in France a decade later. 
This led to the cases levied against France and Turkey for infringing the right to manifest 
a religious belief. The case before France considered female applicants in high school 
who wanted to wear the Islamic headscarf. The case before Turkey concerned a 
university student who wished to wear an Islamic headscarf at university. In both these 
cases the Court upheld the ban on the basis of gender equality, secularism, neutrality. 
The Court relied on its previous opinions, such as the cases Kalac v Turkey10, in which the 
ECtHR held that the manifestation of religion of a public official can be legitimately 
limited, notably because it is incompatible with the functions that a public official should 
uphold. A public official according to the Court should be neutral when dealing with 
the public and should not publicly affiliate themselves to any particular religious belief.  
A similar ruling was held in the case of educators in primary school.  Accordingly, in the 
case of Dahlab v Switzerland11, the Court upheld the Swiss ruling that a primary school 
teacher named Miss Lucia Dahlab should not wear the headscarf. According to Article 
9(2) of the ECHR, state interference of the manifestation of religion can only be limited 
if when prescribed by law, pursues a legitimate aim and is necessary in a democratic 
society. The first two conditions weren’t problematic, but the Court instead placed 
emphasis on the principle of proportionality. In so doing, it gave itself the power to judge 
the symbolic meaning of the headscarf and whether it was in harmony with the values 
of an educator. Accordingly, the Court held that the headscarf was “imposed on 
women” and, thus, that it becomes “difficult to reconcile the wearing of the Islamic 
headscarf with the message of tolerance, of respect for others and above all of equality 
and non-discrimination that, in a democratic society, every teacher must transmit to his 
or her pupils.”12 The Court did state, though, that this was not sufficient to limit the right 
of manifesting her religious beliefs, as there needs to be evidence of the head scarf having 
a “proselytizing effect”.13  
The analysis in Table 2 shows that the European Court of Human Rights has been very 
consistent in its approach to this topic. While cases brought about by Muslim women 
generally had in common their relation to religious female clothing, the claims presented 
before the Court have not been identical. On the contrary, they have covered a variety 
of situations, clothing modalities and legal systems. As we will argue in the discussion 
section of this article, the consistent approach of the Court to these similar but varied 
cases might be expressing an important element of path-dependency. 
 
c. Remaining groups 
The rest of intersectional groups did not seem to exhibit clear patterns of success or 
defeat in litigation, but rather mixed results. Given the low consistency scores of those 
configurations, they were not included in any of the minimizations. In observing the 
Truth Table, we can understand which were those groups. The Truth Table displays all 
combinations of conditions –i.e. all possible intersectional groups with the three 
dimensions included in the analysis-. It also shows the number of cases covered by the 
configuration, as well as the inclusion of each configuration (which can be read as the 
share of cases in that configuration that had a declaration of breach of Art.9(2) as an 
outcome).  
- TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE- 
In Table 3 we can observe a group of configurations with high inclusion scores 
(configurations 1 to 11). These are the configurations included for minimization in the 
analysis of sufficient conditions for the breach of Art.9(2), which we displayed in Table 
1. Additionally, below, the configuration 15 has an inclusion score of 0.000. This was the 
configuration included in the analysis of sufficient conditions for the absence of 
declaration of breach of Art.9(2), in Table 2. Between rows 11 and 15, however, we find 
a number of configurations, some of them with a high number of cases, which displayed 
intermediate inclusion scores and that were not included in any minimization. The 
existence of these configurations (and more generally, the existence of contradictory 
configurations) points at the existence of additional conditions, not included in the 
analysis, that would be necessary if we wanted explain judicial behaviour in its entirety. 
As said in the methods section, rather than that, the aim of this article is to analyse the 
treatment that certain intersectional social groups receive in judicial decision-making. 
In configuration 12 we observe the success rate of national male Christians, which 
constitute the greatest majority of applications by Christian men in general. The 
inclusion of this configuration is 0.68, which is a very intermediate rate of litigation 
success. A possible explanation for this could have been that these applicants often 
belong to minority, as opposed to mainstream, Christian denominations. However, in 
Table 1 we observed that applications by similar Christian groups were more successful 
when filled by legal persons, and also in the only case of women application. 
Finally, the configurations 16 to 24 are logical remainders: configurations of conditions 
that are logically possible but never occurred. In most of these configurations we observe 
a common element: being not national. Therefore, the low overall number of applications 
by non-nationals may be part of the explanation for these configurations empty of cases. 
Also, note that one of these configurations is women Muslim non-national. This qualifies 
the finding in Table 2: being a national Muslim women is not only a safe route to defeat, 
but it actually was also the only type of applications filled by Muslim women, as never 
a member of this group never filed a complaint as not-national.  
 
VI. Discussion 
This article has researched patterns of litigation success and defeat of different groups 
in cases on Art.9(2) ECHR. One of our most salient findings has to do with the 
importance of intersectional approaches when trying to understand the enforcement of 
human rights in the judicial arena. Intersectionality, operated through a methodology 
which is particularly well-suited to capture its complexity, allowed us to observe 
patterns that would have been rendered invisible by unidimensional analyses. In 
general, unidimensional categories did not exhibit patterns of clear victory or clear 
defeat in the activity of the ECtHR. Not even categories over which there could be strong 
presumption of specific judicial treatment, such as being a male applicant, a female 
applicant, or a Muslim applicant. However, simultaneously, the analyses revealed that 
many intersectional categories of applicants did exhibit such clear patterns.  
The case of Muslims applicants is particularly interesting. The idea that the Court could 
be less favorable to these applicants was mostly refuted by the analyses and needs to be 
qualified: it was not Muslims in general, but Muslim women in particular, that were 
systematically defeated in the cases they presented. In fact, male Muslims were a very 
successful category of litigants, wining the greatest majority of the cases they brought 
about. The case presented by a Muslim legal person was also successful. It was Muslim 
women, and only this group, that exhibited a clear pattern of litigation defeat. Indeed, 
strikingly, members of this group lost all cases presented before the Court. Muslim 
women were not only much less successful litigants than their male counter-parts, but 
were indeed by far the most unsuccessful group of all intersectional categories in this 
study. All of this makes clear the importance of intersectionalizing the approach when 
analyzing judicial patterns along identity lines.  
Cases presented by Muslim women, and which were a path to litigation defeat, had a 
clear intersectional dimension. The very terms used by the Court suggest that the 
garment in question is religious in nature. It is also clearly gender-specific, as only 
Muslim women adopt the practice of wearing veilings; as a result, the debate on the 
Islamic veil, both in the form of the headscarf and the face veil, is intersectional insofar 
as it involves at the very least gender and religion. These bans have clear implications 
on Muslim women who veil. When forced to make the decision between manifesting 
religious beliefs and remaining in the public sphere; Muslim women who veil may 
choose to remain in the private sphere and become disconnected from public life.  The 
intersectional framework provided a particularly useful lens to make sense of the 
asymmetry between gender assumptions in the freedom of religion cases and the reality 
lived by Muslim women.  
The findings speak to existing literature on gender and human rights. While there has 
been some disagreement, as to whether intersectionality is a framework, a theory or a 
type of politics (Carbin and Edenheim, 2013), the literature has been clear that Muslim 
women suffer from intersectional discrimination as a result of their intersectional 
identities as both Muslim and female (Vakulenko, 2007).  The limited research done on 
Muslim women in Europe highlights that they face exclusion and subordination based 
on their religious belief and gender. In Sweden, studies suggest that the group which is 
the least integrated into the labour market and in education consists of Muslim women 
from Asian and African descent. Greece has also been criticised, after empirical research 
evidenced that the State treats Muslim women as second class citizens, despite a large 
proportion of them having Greek citizenship (Schiek and Lawson, 2011). Empirical 
research done in Greece and based on the performance of courts suggests that the 
exclusion and subordination faced by Muslim women, like women in the rest of Europe, 
is distinct, in that these women face discrimination on three grounds, on the basis of their 
ethnicity, as Muslims and finally as women (Vakulenko, 2007). This has been especially 
the case in Germany and Netherlands for people from Turkey and Moroccan descent, in 
France and Spain for those from North Africa and in the UK for people from the Indian 
subcontinent, the Middle East and East African (Rosenberger and Sauer, 2010). This 
article adds to this literature, showing that Muslim women have had clear patterns of 
litigation defeat before the ECtHR. The Court has in the past, positioned the Islamic veil, 
to be antithetical to the concept of gender equality. 14 The Court has also held in its case 
law regarding religious manifestations, that gender equality is a cornerstone of the 
ECHR. Yet its case law has allowed Member States to prohibit the wearing of religious 
signs in an increasing number of settings, consequently restricting Muslim women who 
veil to the private sphere.   
Our findings also speak to literature on judicial decision-making and judicial behavior. 
We believe that the main contribution of the paper is, in this regard, that it shows that 
QCA can be a powerful tool to understand how judicial decisions have a differential 
impact in different intersectional categories. This might open avenues for future 
research. At the same time, the patterns found by the analyses can be read on the light 
of some of the literature in the field. Research on judicial politics suggests that courts 
often seek strategies to avoid decisions that are politically costly (Closa, 2013). Such 
literature also suggests that judicial decision-making is by definition about creating 
winners and losers (Stone Sweet, 2002), and in principle whatever decision a court makes 
it will very likely leave dissatisfied at least one of the parties. These two aspects are 
relevant to the cases presented by Muslim women in this research. These cases often had 
an element of ‘claim intersectionality’ related to gendered religious clothing. As said in 
the introduction, these manifestations have in fact become a central object of political 
controversy in Europe involving aspects related to identity, the role of religion in the 
public sphere, the treatment of minorities, conflicting gender narratives, etc. In this 
context, the Court might have preferred to follow a strategy of deference to States in 
order to minimize costs of deciding on a politically sensitive issue. Precisely because this 
topic is highly contentious, a judicial decision against State legislation could have been 
framed by its opponents as an illegitimate expression of judicial activism imposing 
judges’ preferences on democratically elected national legislators. Of course, by deciding 
against the petition of the applicant, the Court is still making a contentious choice and 
adjudicating against the preferences of one of the parties. But in so doing, the Court 
might present itself as leaving the final decision on the right of religious manifestation 
of Muslim women in the hands of the States, in order to try to minimize the blame. The 
Court might interpret this as the least costly option, one that allows it to appear as simply 
exercising judicial restraint and legitimate deference towards the Contracting Parties, 
that carry the ultimate responsibility for the decision. 
Additionally, an important element of path dependency may underlie to the rulings. The 
idea of path-dependency in the judicial arena poses that previous decisions condition 
judicial decision-making for subsequent cases, increasing the incentives to persevere in 
the same jurisprudential line (Stone Sweet, 2002). This might be an additional factor 
limiting the chances that the Court reverses its doctrine on Muslim female clothing in 
the medium run. Was the Court to change its course of action in the future, it is 
expectable that it would do it with regards to new cases that presented new aspects not 
analyzed in previous case-law. That would offer the Court an excuse to change its 
approach in an incremental way. The option of a radical break-up with previous case-
law, while not impossible, is costly from the perspective of jurisprudential consistency, 
and therefore it is less expectable, especially in a scenario of political polarization.  
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Table 1. Analysis of sufficient conditions for declarations of breach of Art.9(2) 
Path Incl PRI cov.r cov.u Cases 
 
Mixed_gender 0.867 0.867 0.277 0.277 25,27,30; 12,22,26,37,42, 
43,56,63,64; 1; 18; 31 
 
Male*Muslim 0.900 0.900 0.191 0.191 6,28,29,32,46,47,48,55,57,59 
 
Female*Christian 1.000 1.000 0.021 0.021 40 
 
Legal_person*Christian 0.800 0.800 0.085 0.085 9,10,20,39,45 
 
Legal_person*Muslim 1.000 1.000 0.021 0.021 50 
 
Not_national*Male 1.000 1.000 0.085 0.085 44; 3,33,38 
 
Model 0.889 0.889 0.681   
Cases in bold are consistent (breach). Cases in italics and underlined are inconsistent 






Table 2. Analysis of sufficient conditions for absence of declaration of breach of 
Art.9(2) 
Path Incl PRI cov.r cov.u Cases 
 
national*Muslim*female 1.000 1.000 0.316  5,7,34,35,49,52 
 
Model 1.000 1.000 0.316   



















Table 3. Truth Table  
# National Gender Religion N Incl PRI Cases 
1 Yes Female Christian 1 1.000 1.000 40  
2 Yes Mixed Other 3 1.000 1.000 25,27,30 
3 Yes Mixed Muslim 1 1.000 1.000 1  
4 Yes Legal p. Muslim 1 1.000 1.000 50  
5 No Male Other 1 1.000 1.000 44 
6 No Male Christian 3 1.000 1.000 3,33,38 
7 No Mixed Other 1 1.000 1.000 18 
8 No Mixed Christian 1 1.000 1.000 31 
9 Yes Male Muslim 10 0.900 0.900 6,28,29,32,46,47, 
48,55,57,59  
10 Yes Legal p. Christian 5 0.800 0.800 9,10,20,39,45  
11 Yes Mixed Christian 9 0.778 0.778 12,22,26,37,42,43,56,63,64 
12 Yes Male Christian 16 0.688 0.688 2,4,8,11,14,15,16,17,19,51,
53,54,61,62,65,66 
13 Yes Legal P. Other 3 0.667 0.667 36,41,58 
14 Yes Male Other 5 0.400 0.400 13,21,23,24,60 
15 Yes Female Muslim 6 0.000 0.000 5,7,34,35,49,52 
16 Yes Female Other 0 - -  
17 No Male Muslim 0 - -  
18 No Female Other 0 - -  
19 No Female Christian 0 - -  
20 No Female Muslim 0 - -  
21 No Mixed Muslim 0 - -  
22 No Legal p. Other 0 - -  
23 No Legal p. Christian 0 - -  
24 No Legal p. Muslim 0 - -  
Cases in bold indicate declaration of breach (consistent cases). Cases in italics and 
underlined indicate no declaration of breach (inconsistent cases). See Appendix for the 





















Appendix 1. List of cases 
1 CASE OF İZZETTİN DOĞAN AND OTHERS v. 
TURKEY 
34 CASE OF DOGRU v. FRANCE 
2 CASE OF MOZER v. THE REPUBLIC OF 
MOLDOVA  
35 CASE OF KERVANCI v. FRANCE 
3 CASE OF MOZER v. THE REPUBLIC OF RUSSIA 36 CASE OF LEELA FORDERKREIS E.V. AND OTHERS 
v. GERMANY 
4 CASE OF SÜVEGES v. HUNGARY 37 CASE OF RELIGIONSGEMEINSCHAFT DER 
ZEUGEN JEHOVAS AND OTHERS v. AUSTRIA 
5 CASE OF EBRAHIMIAN v. FRANCE 38 CASE OF PERRY v. LATVIA 
6 CASE OF GÜLER AND UĞUR v. TURKEY 39 CASE OF SVYATO-MYKHAYLIVSKA PARAFIYA v. 
UKRAINE 
7 CASE OF S.A.S. v. FRANCE 40 CASE OF IVANOVA v. BULGARIA 
8 CASE OF KRUPKO AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA 41 CASE OF CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY MOSCOW v. 
RUSSIA 
9 CASE OF BIBLICAL CENTRE OF THE CHUVASH 
REPUBLIC v. RUSSIA 
42 CASE OF BISERICA ADEVARAT ORTODOXA DIN 
MOLDOVA v. MOLDOVA 
10 CASE OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF 
LATTER-DAY SAINTS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM 
43 CASE OF KUZNETSOV AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA 
11 CASE OF AUSTRIANU v. ROMANIA 44 CASE OF IGORS DMITRIJEVS v. LATVIA 
12 CASE OF EWEIDA AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED 
KINGDOM 
45 CASE OF THE MOSCOW BRANCH OF THE 
SALVATION ARMY v. RUSSIA 
13 CASE OF FRANCESCO SESSA v. ITALY 46 CASE OF AGGA v. GREECE (N° 3) 
14 CASE OF FETİ DEMİRTAŞ v. TURKEY 47 CASE OF AGGA v. GREECE (N° 4) 
15 CASE OF BUKHARATYAN v. ARMENIA 48 CASE OF KOSTESKI v. "THE FORMER YUGOSLAV 
REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA" 
16 CASE OF TSATURYAN v. ARMENIA 49 CASE OF LEYLA ŞAHİN v. TURKEY (1) 
17 CASE OF ERÇEP v. TURKEY 50 CASE OF SUPREME HOLY COUNCIL OF THE 
MUSLIM COMMUNITY v. BULGARIA 
18 CASE OF DIMITRAS AND OTHERS v. GREECE 1  51 CASE OF VERGOS v. GREECE 
19 CASE OF BAYATYAN v. ARMENIA 52 CASE OF LEYLA ŞAHİN v. TURKEY (2) 
20 CASE OF ASSOCIATION LES TÉMOINS DE 
JÉHOVAH v. France 
53 CASE OF POLTORATSKIY v. UKRAINE 
21 CASE OF WASMUTH v. GERMANY 54 CASE OF KUZNETSOV v. UKRAINE 
22 CASE OF BOYCHEV AND OTHERS v. BULGARIA 
(Nº1) 
55 CASE OF AGGA v. GREECE (No. 2) 
23 CASE OF HERRMANN v. GERMANY 56 CASE OF METROPOLITAN CHURCH OF 
BESSARABIA AND OTHERS v. MOLDOVA 
24 CASE OF JAKÓBSKI v. POLAND 57 CASE OF HASAN AND CHAUSH v. BULGARIA 
(HASAN) 
25 CASE OF GRZELAK v. POLAND (1) 58 CASE OF CHA'ARE SHALOM VE TSEDEK v. 
FRANCE 
26 CASE OF JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES OF MOSCOW 
AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA 
59 CASE OF SERIF v. GREECE 
27 CASE OF DIMITRAS AND OTHERS v. GREECE 2  60 CASE OF BUSCARINI AND OTHERS v. SAN 
MARINO 
28 CASE OF AHMET ARSLAN AND OTHERS v. 
TURKEY 
61 CASE OF LARISSIS AND OTHERS v. GREECE  
29 CASE OF SİNAN IŞIK v. TURKEY 62 CASE OF PENTIDIS AND OTHERS v. GREECE 
30 CASE OF KIMLYA AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA 63 CASE OF VALSAMIS v. GREECE 
31 CASE OF MIROLUBOVS AND OTHERS v. LATVIA 64 CASE OF EFSTRATIOU v. GREECE 
32 CASE OF MASAEV v. MOLDOVA 65 CASE OF MANOUSSAKIS AND OTHERS v. GREECE 




Appendix 2. QCA DATA MATRIX 
Ruling Breach Not 
national 
gender religion 
IZZETTIN 1 0 2 2 
MOZERvMOLDOVA  0 0 0 1 
MOZERvRUSSIA 1 1 0 1 
SUVEGES 0 0 0 1 
EBRAHIMIAN 0 0 1 2 
GULERANDU 1 0 0 2 
SAS 0 0 1 2 
KRUPKOAND 1 0 0 1 
BIBLICALCENTRE 1 0 3 1 
CHURCHOFJESUSCHRISTvUK 0 0 3 1 
AUSTRIANU 0 0 0 1 
EWEIDA 1 0 2 1 
FRANCESCOSESSA 0 0 0 0 
DEMERTA 1 0 0 1 
BUKHARATYAN 1 0 0 1 
TSATURYAN 1 0 0 1 
ERCEP 1 0 0 1 
DIMITRAS1 1 1 2 0 
BAYATYAN 1 0 0 1 
TEMOINSJEHOVAHvFRANCE 1 0 3 1 
WASMUTH 0 0 0 0 
BOYCHEV1 1 0 2 1 
HERRMANN 0 0 0 0 
JAKOBSKI 1 0 0 0 
GRZELAK1 1 0 2 0 
JEHOVAHSMOSCOWvRUSSIA 1 0 2 1 
DIMITRAS2 1 0 2 0 
AHMETARSLAN 1 0 0 2 
SNANIIK 1 0 0 2 
KIMLYA 1 0 2 0 
MIROLUBOVS1 1 1 2 1 
MASAEV 1 0 0 2 
NOLANK 1 1 0 1 
DOGRU 0 0 1 2 
KERVANCI 0 0 1 2 
FORDERKREIS 1 0 3 0 
RELIGIONSGEMEINSCHAFTEHOVASvAUSTRIA 1 0 2 1 
PERRY 1 1 0 1 
SVYATOMYKHAYLIVSKA 1 0 3 1 
IVANOVA 1 0 1 1 
SCIENTOLOGYMOSCOW 1 0 3 0 
BISERICAMOLDOVA 1 0 2 1 
KUZNETSOV 1 0 2 1 
DMITRIJEVS 1 1 0 0 
MOSCOWSALVATIONARMY 1 0 3 1 
AGGA3 1 0 0 2 
AGGA4 1 0 0 2 
KOSTESKI 0 0 0 2 
LEYLA 0 0 1 2 
COUNCILMUSLIMCOMMUNITYvBULGARIA 1 0 3 2 
VERGOS 0 0 0 1 
LEYLASAHINvTURKEY 0 0 1 2 
POLTORATSKIY 1 0 0 1 
KUZNETSOV 1 0 0 1 
AGGA2 1 0 0 2 
CHURCHBESSARABIA 1 0 2 1 
HASANANDCHAUSH 1 0 0 2 
CHAARESHALOM 0 0 3 0 
SERIF 1 0 0 2 
BUSCARINI 1 0 0 0 
LARISSIS 1 0 0 1 
PENTIDIS 0 0 0 1 
VALSAMIS 0 0 2 1 
EFSTRATIOU 0 0 2 1 
MANOUSSAKIS 1 0 0 1 
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